

# What is Triple Gridlock?

speeds are worsening within the Manhattan (CBD).


### 1. Street Gridlock 2. Subway Gridlock


After nearly a decade of Transit ridership has climbed to levels not seen for 60 improved traffic flow, travel eyears. But antiquated communications systems limit Non-cetrain throughput. "Trains are forced to wait in stations while crowds of passengers exit and enter the cars, Central Business District Causing delays that ricochet through the system." (RPA)







### 3. Political Gridlock [тк]





1981






1999

In 2007, following 35 years documenting fossil-fuel pollution, deconstructing nuclear power cost escalation, and spearheading "livable streets" activism locally and nationally, I turned my attention to "traffic pricing," particularly congestion pricing in New York City.

My touchstone was an epigram by the German scholar-activist Wolfgang Sachs, a student of the philosopher Ivan Illich. [See next slide.]

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#### 1. Street Gridlock




Sachs' epigram suggested two avenues: analytical and political. I pursued both.

#### **ANALYTICAL:**

With funding from the Nurture Nature Foundation, I created a spreadsheet model that, inter alia, estimates the "social delay costs" from an "incremental" car trip into the Manhattan CBD.

The "Balanced
Transportation
Analyzer" (BTA 1.1):



- Treats transit, as well as motor vehicles.
- Has 67 tabs (worksheets), 500,000 (?) cells.
- Yet consumes only 5 MB.
- Runs new toll scenarios in seconds.
- Interactive: 000s of feedback loops.
- Outputs (time savings, environmental benefits, etc.) are expressed in both physical quantities & monetary equivalents.

Any driving trip into the CBD betw 2-8 p.m. slows all other vehicles by a total of ~3 hours.

### Why Traffic Pricing?

- Reduce Congestion
- Manage Traffic
- Generate Revenue

### Why Congestion Pricing?

- Big traffic payoff from reducing hypercongestion
- Big revenue payoff since trips are high-value
- Society wins even if forecasts inexact
  - If too many trips disappear, traffic flow improves more
- If too few trips disappear, revenue is greater

## Congestion Pricing is Binary. Good or Bad?


- Good: Simple and inexpensive to administer
- Bad: Arbitrary quality of all or nothing
- Bad: Runs counter to digital/micro zeitgeist

#### **POLITICAL:**


In 2011, I
joined forces
with traffic
engineer Sam
Schwartz
(Gridlock
Sam), who
was devising a
toll-reform
proposal built
around two
precepts:

1. Charge more where there's more traffic and good transit.

2. Lower tolls everywhere else.



Here's what we get when we run Sam's tolls through my BTA model



Even with the rollback of tolls on the seven MTA bridges, and with ¼ of net proceeds allocated to roads and bridges, there's enough \$\$ to fill the gap in the 2015-2019 MTA capital plan - without more debt or new taxes.

And: CBD travel speeds are predicted to rise 15-20%.

### 2. Subway Gridlock

### Imagining a fully funded MTA capital plan

Case study: CBTC

[Communications-Based Train Control]

- Max # trains/hour (per line)
  - Today ("fixed-block wayside signals"): 20-25
  - With CBTC: 30
- Resulting increases in passenger capacity
  - Δ trains/hr (per line): + 7.5
  - Δ passenger cpcty/hr (per line): + 9,600 (7.5 x 1,275)
  - Δ passenger cpcty/hr (14 lines): + 144,000 (14 x 9,600)
  - $\Delta$  cpcty per 15 hrs: +2,020,000 ( =  $\Delta$  +36%)

CBTC, even more than new lines (or countdown clocks), is central to making subways reliable, sufficient and humane.

#### 3. Political Gridlock



Mayor de Blasio says city funds MTA enough



Cuomo goes after de Blasio over MTA capital plan

NY Daily News, 10-13-15.

By statute, the public authority in charge of NYC's transit system is controlled by the governor.

Moreover, any new tolls require approval by the state legislature.

Net Benefit of Selected

Albany, then, rather than City Hall, is the gatekeeper for toll reform.

Mutual antagonism between the mayor and the governor has turned the customary mixed rivalry between the two offices into a zero-sum game.

A sense of shared interests that might enable the two executives to hammer out a generational overhaul of transportation tolling and finance is lacking.

(Transit) (Divers) Reven

Their feud, not policy options, rivets the public. A political truce is hailed as the policy solution.

The likely outcome: an underfunded capital plan (w/fare hikes to amortize the debt) and no toll reform.

Street gridlock and subway gridlock worsen.

### \$2.5 billion a year in net benefits. Spurned?

